http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/business/global/15ubs.html?ref=business
No legal action, in other words
Fuck You common stock holders
We don't even consider you anything to worry about, let alone worry for!
Legal action might just actually implicate us, so we're making no waves in hopes this situation will just go away!
The Swiss bank UBS said Thursday that it will not take legal action against former executives and board members for the huge losses suffered during the U.S. subprime crisis that forced a bailout of the company.
Kaspar Villiger, chairman of Switzerland’s largest bank, said in a statement that the company had learned lessons from the crisis and now was focusing on the future.
“What happened should not have been allowed to happen
“Despite warnings, the bank falsely believed that its financial products in relation to the U.S. real estate market were valuable and sufficiently hedged against losses,” the report said.
UBS, long the star of the Swiss banking industry, lost billions of dollars during the global economic crisis and the confidence of many investors during a lengthy tax dispute with the United States.
Regarding this dispute, the report acknowledged that the bank had not made a comprehensive assessment of the compliance risk of its U.S. cross-border wealth management business before the investigation by U.S. authorities
Showing posts with label subprime. Show all posts
Showing posts with label subprime. Show all posts
Thursday, October 14, 2010
Monday, October 11, 2010
Ohio hit hard by foreclosures
http://washingtonindependent.com/100237/ohio-hit-hard-by-foreclosure-now-at-epicenter-of-fraud-crisis
Remember when some of the states tried to keep predatory lending out and the Federal government sued them to make sure that the Banks has the right to go ahead and fleece those states constituents anyway?
Those very same people are now going to investigate the foreclosure mess?
Or Congress is going to investigate and do nothing about it. Just like they did nothing with the revelations the Goldman Sachs was betting against the crap that they were selling to their customers as viable.
The foreclosure situation in the US as well as screwing the investors that bought all of those mortgage backed securities is a crime.
And a criminal investigation should not be done by anyone who helped perpetuate the crime, as well as anyone who helped to cover it up.
So that would leave out Congress as well as the Justice department.
The question is: Just who exactly can be trusted without bias to really investigate what can only be envisioned now as racketeering?
“I’ve seen the foreclosure issue go from predatory loans, to subprime loans, to predatory loans, to an economic situation where folks have been laid off,” Jones explains. “And now we’re back to problems with paperwork.”
Ohio — and especially Cleveland — was hit earlier and worse by the foreclosure crisis than other states, due to widespread problems with predatory lending, an early economic downturn stemming from the loss of manufacturing jobs, and weak consumer-protection laws. Now, it is at the forefront of the foreclosure fraud crisis, with housing advocates and politicians calling for banks to halt evictions immediately and stop seizing homes.
Remember when some of the states tried to keep predatory lending out and the Federal government sued them to make sure that the Banks has the right to go ahead and fleece those states constituents anyway?
Those very same people are now going to investigate the foreclosure mess?
Or Congress is going to investigate and do nothing about it. Just like they did nothing with the revelations the Goldman Sachs was betting against the crap that they were selling to their customers as viable.
The foreclosure situation in the US as well as screwing the investors that bought all of those mortgage backed securities is a crime.
And a criminal investigation should not be done by anyone who helped perpetuate the crime, as well as anyone who helped to cover it up.
So that would leave out Congress as well as the Justice department.
The question is: Just who exactly can be trusted without bias to really investigate what can only be envisioned now as racketeering?
“I’ve seen the foreclosure issue go from predatory loans, to subprime loans, to predatory loans, to an economic situation where folks have been laid off,” Jones explains. “And now we’re back to problems with paperwork.”
Ohio — and especially Cleveland — was hit earlier and worse by the foreclosure crisis than other states, due to widespread problems with predatory lending, an early economic downturn stemming from the loss of manufacturing jobs, and weak consumer-protection laws. Now, it is at the forefront of the foreclosure fraud crisis, with housing advocates and politicians calling for banks to halt evictions immediately and stop seizing homes.
Wednesday, October 6, 2010
Jérôme Kerviel: 'I had to be killed so Société Générale could survive'
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/oct/06/jerome-kerviel-societe-generale
The token sacrifice that led to the public exposure of subprime
Rogue trader speaks out against court verdict, saying he was being made to pay for the malpractice of several people
"From the start of the investigation I have admitted what I was responsible for, what I did wrong, while at the same time providing factual material proving that my colleagues and my superiors knew what I was doing," he said. He admitted that he and his lawyer, Olivier Metzner, had failed to convince the court. "We probably didn't know how to explain that and make the court realise and prove once and for all that it wasn't just me in that boat."
The token sacrifice that led to the public exposure of subprime
Rogue trader speaks out against court verdict, saying he was being made to pay for the malpractice of several people
"From the start of the investigation I have admitted what I was responsible for, what I did wrong, while at the same time providing factual material proving that my colleagues and my superiors knew what I was doing," he said. He admitted that he and his lawyer, Olivier Metzner, had failed to convince the court. "We probably didn't know how to explain that and make the court realise and prove once and for all that it wasn't just me in that boat."
AIG's Lewis Retires After Saying `We Were Wrong' About Subprime
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-05/aig-s-bob-lewis-chief-risk-officer-during-crisis-steps-down-from-insurer.html
This whole situation is getting harder and harder to believe.
This guy was the chief risk officer, how could he have not known?
American International Group Inc. Chief Risk Officer Robert Lewis is resigning after saying this year that the insurer underestimated the risk of derivative contracts tied to subprime mortgages.
“We were wrong about how bad things could get,” Lewis told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in June. “What ended up happening was so extreme that it was beyond anything we had planned for.”
An Understatement’
Lewis said he didn’t know that derivatives backing mortgage-linked securities had collateral-call provisions until after Goldman Sachs Group Inc. made its first demand in July 2007, according to the FCIC documents. When asked if the provisions caused consternation within AIG, Lewis said, “I would say that’s an understatement.”
“I only became aware of the collateral calls completely in the latter part of 2007,” Lewis said at the FCIC hearing.
This whole situation is getting harder and harder to believe.
This guy was the chief risk officer, how could he have not known?
American International Group Inc. Chief Risk Officer Robert Lewis is resigning after saying this year that the insurer underestimated the risk of derivative contracts tied to subprime mortgages.
“We were wrong about how bad things could get,” Lewis told the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in June. “What ended up happening was so extreme that it was beyond anything we had planned for.”
An Understatement’
Lewis said he didn’t know that derivatives backing mortgage-linked securities had collateral-call provisions until after Goldman Sachs Group Inc. made its first demand in July 2007, according to the FCIC documents. When asked if the provisions caused consternation within AIG, Lewis said, “I would say that’s an understatement.”
“I only became aware of the collateral calls completely in the latter part of 2007,” Lewis said at the FCIC hearing.
Thursday, April 8, 2010
But I didn't know .....really
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Rubin-says-he-learned-late-of-apf-521735539.html?x=0&sec=topStories&pos=6&asset=&ccode=
Robert Rubin, a senior adviser to Citigroup Inc. at the time of its deep losses from subprime mortgages, says he learned belatedly that Citi had $43 billion in high-risk securities on its books.
Rubin says, "I do not recall knowing before September 2007" that the bank had held onto the investments composed of repackaged mortgage bonds. In November 2007, Citigroup publicly estimated it would lose $8 billion to $11 billion in the fourth quarter that year from those securities.
Robert Rubin, a senior adviser to Citigroup Inc. at the time of its deep losses from subprime mortgages, says he learned belatedly that Citi had $43 billion in high-risk securities on its books.
Rubin says, "I do not recall knowing before September 2007" that the bank had held onto the investments composed of repackaged mortgage bonds. In November 2007, Citigroup publicly estimated it would lose $8 billion to $11 billion in the fourth quarter that year from those securities.
Fed Reviews Find Errors in Oversight of Citigroup
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/fed-reviews-find-errors-in-oversight-of-citigroup/?partner=yahoofinance
Even after the FED took over monitering Citigroup they failed to recognize just how serious the situation was, and they want us to give them more power WHY?
It seem to me that they (The FED) wouldn't know what to do with it if they had it anyway.
Citigroup ran into trouble under the noses of federal regulators. But even after taxpayers rescued the financial giant, regulators failed to monitor the company adequately, according to reviews by the Federal Reserve, Sewell Chan and Eric Dash report for The New York Times.
Excerpts of two Fed reviews were released on Wednesday as the committee examining the causes of the financial crisis began three days of hearings on the problems at Citigroup, Fannie Mae and the subprime mortgage market.
The panel heard a strong defense of the Fed from its former chairman, Alan Greenspan, who fended off a barrage of questions about the Fed’s failure to crack down on subprime mortgages and other abusive lending practices during his tenure.
But the excerpts, culled from thousands of documents turned over to the bipartisan Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, painted a troubling picture of the Fed’s oversight of Citigroup both before and after Mr. Greenspan left the Fed — and again after Citigroup received three taxpayer-financed bailouts.
The most recent documents from 2009 portray bank examiners from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, then headed by Timothy F. Geithner, now the Treasury secretary, as overly optimistic about Citigroup’s prospects, according to a person briefed on their contents.
Even after the FED took over monitering Citigroup they failed to recognize just how serious the situation was, and they want us to give them more power WHY?
It seem to me that they (The FED) wouldn't know what to do with it if they had it anyway.
Citigroup ran into trouble under the noses of federal regulators. But even after taxpayers rescued the financial giant, regulators failed to monitor the company adequately, according to reviews by the Federal Reserve, Sewell Chan and Eric Dash report for The New York Times.
Excerpts of two Fed reviews were released on Wednesday as the committee examining the causes of the financial crisis began three days of hearings on the problems at Citigroup, Fannie Mae and the subprime mortgage market.
The panel heard a strong defense of the Fed from its former chairman, Alan Greenspan, who fended off a barrage of questions about the Fed’s failure to crack down on subprime mortgages and other abusive lending practices during his tenure.
But the excerpts, culled from thousands of documents turned over to the bipartisan Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, painted a troubling picture of the Fed’s oversight of Citigroup both before and after Mr. Greenspan left the Fed — and again after Citigroup received three taxpayer-financed bailouts.
The most recent documents from 2009 portray bank examiners from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, then headed by Timothy F. Geithner, now the Treasury secretary, as overly optimistic about Citigroup’s prospects, according to a person briefed on their contents.
Sunday, November 1, 2009
How Goldman secretly bet on the U.S. housing crash
How Goldman secretly bet on the U.S. housing crash
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/77791.html
In 2006 and 2007, Goldman Sachs Group peddled more than $40 billion in securities backed by at least 200,000 risky home mortgages, but never told the buyers it was secretly betting that a sharp drop in U.S. housing prices would send the value of those securities plummeting.
Goldman's sales and its clandestine wagers, completed at the brink of the housing market meltdown, enabled the nation's premier investment bank to pass most of its potential losses to others before a flood of mortgage defaults staggered the U.S. and global economies.
Only later did investors discover that what Goldman had promoted as triple-A rated investments were closer to junk.
Now, pension funds, insurance companies, labor unions and foreign financial institutions that bought those dicey mortgage securities are facing large losses, and a five-month McClatchy investigation has found that Goldman's failure to disclose that it made secret, exotic bets on an imminent housing crash may have violated securities laws.
"The Securities and Exchange Commission should be very interested in any financial company that secretly decides a financial product is a loser and then goes out and actively markets that product or very similar products to unsuspecting customers without disclosing its true opinion," said Laurence Kotlikoff, a Boston University economics professor who's proposed a massive overhaul of the nation's banks. "This is fraud and should be prosecuted."
John Coffee, a Columbia University
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/227/story/77791.html
In 2006 and 2007, Goldman Sachs Group peddled more than $40 billion in securities backed by at least 200,000 risky home mortgages, but never told the buyers it was secretly betting that a sharp drop in U.S. housing prices would send the value of those securities plummeting.
Goldman's sales and its clandestine wagers, completed at the brink of the housing market meltdown, enabled the nation's premier investment bank to pass most of its potential losses to others before a flood of mortgage defaults staggered the U.S. and global economies.
Only later did investors discover that what Goldman had promoted as triple-A rated investments were closer to junk.
Now, pension funds, insurance companies, labor unions and foreign financial institutions that bought those dicey mortgage securities are facing large losses, and a five-month McClatchy investigation has found that Goldman's failure to disclose that it made secret, exotic bets on an imminent housing crash may have violated securities laws.
"The Securities and Exchange Commission should be very interested in any financial company that secretly decides a financial product is a loser and then goes out and actively markets that product or very similar products to unsuspecting customers without disclosing its true opinion," said Laurence Kotlikoff, a Boston University economics professor who's proposed a massive overhaul of the nation's banks. "This is fraud and should be prosecuted."
John Coffee, a Columbia University
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